[Cryptography] Signal planning no support for plaintext SMS

Natanael natanael.l at gmail.com
Thu Nov 10 20:05:59 EST 2022


Den tors 10 nov. 2022 23:27Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> skrev:

> Nothing of substance has changed since this was posted;
>
>
> https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/06/26/can-apple-read-your-imessages/
>
>
> Actually, a great deal has changed.  The stuff that's encrypted, and even
> more the stuff that end-to-end encrypted, has changed significantly over
> the years.  In 2013, the only thing end-to-end encrypted was your
> keychain.  The list has now grown significantly.
>
> While it does seem like the updated docs imply the key for iMessage
backups is now protected by the account password, that doesn't explain this;

https://www.apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests/

https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/legal-process-guidelines-us.pdf

"Cloud stores content for the services that the customer has elected to
maintain in the account while the customer’s account remains active. Apple
does not retain deleted content once it is cleared from Apple’s servers.
iCloud content may include email, stored photos, documents, contacts,
calendars, bookmarks, Safari Browsing History, Maps Search History,
Messages and iOS device backups. iOS device backups may include photos and
videos in the Camera Roll, device settings, app data, iMessage, Business
Chat, SMS, and MMS messages and voicemail. All iCloud content data stored
by Apple is encrypted at the location of the server. Apple retains the
encryption keys in its U.S. data centers. iCloud content, as it exists in
the customer’s account, may be provided in response to a search warrant
issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent."
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