[Cryptography] Signal planning no support for plaintext SMS

Shironeko shironeko at waifu.club
Wed Nov 9 21:07:21 EST 2022

Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> writes:

>> On Nov 9, 2022, at 7:56 PM, Shironeko <shironeko at waifu.club> wrote:
>> Hear it from apple’s mouth, <https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303> and see
>> heading “Messages in iCloud”
>> • For Messages in iCloud, if you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup
>> • includes a copy of the key protecting your messages. This ensures you can
>> • recover your messages if you lose access to your Keychain and your trusted
>> • devices. When you turn off iCloud Backup, a new key is generated on your device
>> • to protect future messages and isn’t stored by Apple.
> Yes, it has the key - encrypted with a key derived from your password.
> Note the following text a bit further down in the same document:
> “iCloud Data Recovery Service
> If you forget your password or device passcode, iCloud Data Recovery Service can
> help you decrypt your data so you can regain access to your photos, notes,
> documents, device backups, and more. *Data types that are protected by
> end-to-end encryption—such as your Keychain, Messages, Screen Time, and Health
> data—are not accessible via iCloud Data Recovery Service. Your device passcodes,
> which only you know, are required to decrypt and access them.* Only you can
> access this information, and only on devices where you’re signed in to iCloud.”

So you are saying it is self-contradictory? How can it “recover your messages if
you lose access to your Keychain and your trusted devices” then.

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