[Cryptography] Signal planning no support for plaintext SMS

Shironeko shironeko at waifu.club
Wed Nov 9 15:28:18 EST 2022

Ron Garret <ron at flownet.com> writes:
> Apple can push an OS update that gives them access to your keys even without iCloud any time they want.  So with or without iCloud, your security with iMessage is entirely dependent on Apple’s trustworthiness.
> And this is true in general for any vendor. The only way you can be absolutely
> sure that there isn’t a back door in your comms is to build your own silicon
> foundry from the ground up. The minute you use *any* third-party hardware or
> software *anywhere* in your process you open yourself up to a rusting-trust
> attack.
> So as a practical matter you have to trust someone, especially if you’re a muggle.  It might as well be Apple.

This is has nothing to do with the problem I mentioned. Trusting trust is a very
real but different threat.

What I want to point out is that iMessage’s existing implementation is
verifiably non-secure. It is not a theoretical attack vector or something they
hide in an upgrade. Apple performs an mitm attack on their supposedly “end to
end encrypted” system literally every day, it’s called recovering from an iCloud
backup. If they system is “end to end encrypted” they will not have the ability
to do that.

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