[Cryptography] Signal planning no support for plaintext SMS

[Shironeko]

> From: Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com>
>
> iMessage most definitely “doesn’t suck.” It’s highly usable, and is used by
> hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people - who need make no special
> effort to use it in a secure way. (In fact, I would contend that any system that
> requires the user to specifically pay attention to the system’s security is
> forever going to restricted to a small subset of potential users.) Granted, it’s
> only available on Apple devices - though it works fine on both phones and
> computers (and other devices with no phone number). Is “ability to run on my
> favorite OS that isn’t Apple’s” part of your “doesn’t suck” definition?

I don’t know under what definition does iMessage not suck. From all I can gather
the security of iMessage drops to basically the same level as email the moment
you enable iCloud. Your message keys are stored in iCloud and Apple have full
access. Simply because they has been ignoring some government requests doesn’t
mean it is secure. “I don’t use iCloud” doesn’t matter much when people you are
messaging do. This is not even considering the fact that Apple already have a
parallel implementation for chinese that have all the backdoors so when they do
want to use their mitm position they don’t even need pay someone to write more
code.