[Cryptography] Internet independent Blockchain
Matthieu CHARETTE
matthieu.charette at gmail.com
Sun Dec 4 03:34:56 EST 2022
> What do you think of rejecting the double-spend that has smaller
> proof-of-work history, replaying any lost transactions in the next
> block, and including record of the double-spend so everyone can
> identify the key that misbehaved?
I really like your idea. It can really be helpful.
So to summary:
- The attacker has $15 on address A0.
- He signs a transaction T1 sending $10 from A0 to address A1.
- He signs a transaction T2 sending $10 from A0 to address A2.
- He sends T1 to miner M1 and T2 to miner M2 at the same time (or at
least before M1 and M2 sync).
- When M1 and M2 sync, the least powerful one, let say M2, will have to
discard all blocks after T2 (including T2 too).
- M1 and M2 keep a record of T2 (they might send it to other nodes too)
so they will never allow transactions coming from A0 anymore.
Is it a good summary?
The problem is that the attacker can just have $10 on A0. And try to
send $10 on A1 and $10 on A2. In this case the balance of A0 will be
$0. So the attacker doesn't care about the fact that nodes will not
accept transactions coming from A0.
Any suggestions on this?
BR,
Matthieu
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