[Cryptography] Used election machinery?

John Denker jsd at av8n.com
Sat Jul 24 22:14:40 EDT 2021


On 7/23/21 9:56 PM, Ray Dillinger wrote:

> equipment that has already been decertified.  So that
> equipment is likely to be sold on the secondary market to private
> citizens, or outright scrapped.
> 
> I am of the opinion that this machinery should be acquired by security
> researchers who can do a real audit, not of any election in particular,
> but of the machinery itself.  To investigate its function and security,
> entirely without involving any real ballots that have been cast or real
> elections that have been decided and/or challenged. 

1a) This is well worth doing. Similar investigations have been conducted
 in the past, generally with innnnteresting results.

1b) I am quite confident there are bugs waiting to be found. With my own
 eyes I have seen ballot marking devices screw up. Here is some background
 reading: Tip of the iceberg:
  https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/12/def-con-hackers-lawmakers-came-together-tackle-holes-election-security/

1c) There is tremendous good that can come of this. For starters, consider
 the 2018 litigation that compelled Georgia to replace its election
 equipment in time for the 2020 election ... which meant that they had
 auditable paper ballots ... just in time to avert a really bad outcome.

2a) There are some nasty non-technical hurdles to overcome before the
 interesting work can begin. The vendors engage in quite a bit of
 security-by-obscurity. Everybody on this list thinks they shouldn't.
 but in fact they do. That is, all the machines they sell are subject
 to strict non-disclosure agreements. There are also *laws* in many
 jurisdictions that forbid hacking -- even white-hat hacking -- of
 voting machines.

2b) The "cyber ninjas" obviously don't consider themselves bound by
 confidentiality agreements, or even by laws. This may help with the
 hurdles. Cats out of bags frolicking with horses out of barns.

3) Item (2) does not outweigh item (3). It's still a good idea. I'm just
 suggesting that before we get too far into it, we should line up resources
 sufficient for doing the job properly.

 It might be worth calling the Brennan Center to see if they would be
 interested in sponsoring such an exercise, and/or know anybody who might
 be interested in co-sponsoring.


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