[Cryptography] QM giveth, QM taketh away
Bill Frantz
frantz at pwpconsult.com
Sat Feb 13 10:20:13 EST 2021
On 2/12/21 at 9:39 PM, leichter at lrw.com (Jerry Leichter) wrote:
>Quantum key distribution (theoretically) provides a way for
>Alice and Bob to share a random bitstream with strong
>randomness and privacy guarantees. It doesn't give a way to
>transmit a message as such - but once they have that shared
>bitstream, then can use it as a one-time pad.
>
>Note that the actual physical realization of QKD has proven to
>be much trickier than the neat theoretical examples. Still, it
>seems to be getting there - if this is what you want. Keep in
>mind that QKD (and encryption using XOR with a one-time pad)
>have theoretically perfect security properties, but provide no
>authentication (so as with raw DH, you can end up conducting a
>secure communication but with no way of knowing who you are
>actually communicating with).
If I remember correctly, and the quantum techniques haven't
changed, QKD requires sending entangled states between the two
parties and examining how they settle when the entanglement is
broken. The last I looked this required a physical or line of
sight link.
If all this is vaguely true, then protecting the link is a
viable way of providing a reasonable level of authentication for
the other end.
I vaguely remember hearing about a communication link in the
Washington DC area that ran beside a freeway. To protect the
link against various "tapping in" attacks ended with the link
costing more per mile than the freeway beside it. Protecting a
quantum link might take this level of effort.
Cheers - Bill
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Bill Frantz | Concurrency is hard. 12 | Periwinkle
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