[Cryptography] Signal hypothetical use case becomes practical since cellular providers have started censoring private text messages

John Gilmore gnu at toad.com
Thu Dec 30 19:07:57 EST 2021

Aram Perez via cryptography <cryptography at metzdowd.com> wrote:
> > Recently, I heard a very concerning thing: If you share this link via
> unencrypted SMS on t-mobile, it won't go through:
> https://www.canadiancovidcarealliance.org/media-resources/the-pfizer-inoculations-for-covid-19-more-harm-than-good-2/

I confirm that my T-mobile phone was unable to send this URL (or the
corresponding PDF's url) to a friend whose phone uses Google mobile
service.  However, I was able to write the words of the website name
("canadian covid care alliance dot org") in a text, and that got through.
(An infinite variety of similar circumventions are possible even after
the twisted censors at T-Mobile read this message.)

Re Signal:

If only Signal wasn't actually recording all our contacts permanently in
their servers (under their mandatory PIN requirement), then Signal might
be a useful tool for encrypted messaging.  But somebody apprently got to
them to undermine their users' privacy.

Normally this would not be a problem with free software -- users could
just rip out the offending code.  But Signal's interpretation is that
the license doesn't allow you to rip out the spyware part of the code,
while still using their back-end servers to let your improved version
talk to any other Signal users.


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