[Cryptography] Duh, why aren't most embedded TRNGs designed this way?

[Joachim Strömbergson]

Aloha!

Arnold Reinhold via cryptography wrote on 2021-04-27 22:30:
> Assuming the post-processing uses good cryptographic primitives, this is
> ridiculous. The output from any such primitive will pass statistical
> tests. A far better, and cheaper, design would make raw digitized data
> available to the software, which would then do its own whitening in
> software or using on-chip cryptographic accelerators if available. The
> specifications for the TRNG would provide estimates of entropy rate per
> output bit, based on the type of analysis described in the D2.1 report.
> The software would then know how much raw data it needed to process to
> produces the required entropy. The software could do its own tests on
> the TRNG output. Importantly, the output tests could be designed
> independent of the TRNG module supplier.

The RNG in the CrypTech open HSM (https://cryptech.is/) provides access
to raw entropy as well as to entropy after whitening for this exact reason.

-- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson
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