[Cryptography] Zoom publishes draft cryptographic design for end-to-end encryption

[Jeremy Stanley]

On 2020-06-04 13:32:47 -0700 (-0700), Christian Huitema wrote:
[...]
> Yet I think there is something to that argument, because widely used
> applications are often most vulnerable to nation-state compromises due
> to their business model. Take the example of Skype. The early versions
> of Skype were designed for end-to-end security, and law enforcement
> agencies in many countries were not happy.
[...]

This is a poor example in one sense, but perhaps a very good one in
another. Early versions of Skype were brought to by the makers of
KaZaA, notorious for bundling both adware and spyware free in every
download. If you wanted to make sure you got your system backdoored
quickly, their software came highly recommended.

Corruption can happen at any level. Bigger players may buckle to
nation-state pressure, but smaller ones can get away with selling
you out to the highest bidder and then walking away as soon as
anyone comes looking for them.
-- 
Jeremy Stanley
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