[Cryptography] improved identification of non-targets
Jerry Leichter
leichter at lrw.com
Sun Jan 12 17:20:12 EST 2020
This is overkill. All state armies (pretty) follow the long-agreed-upon laws of war. Among these laws is the requirement that combatants wear their official uniforms. Anyone engaging in combat not wearing uniform is classified as a spy and can be shot on sight. A civilian airliner is "not in uniform" and should be treated the same way.
You'd have to get a lawyer familiar with all the complex details of the laws of war to say exactly how *existing* law applies, but a law in the same spirit could be based on a simple standard for broadcasting "I'm a civilian plane and not a legitimate military target" and should not be hard to agree to. Anyone shooting down such a plane, or a combatant broadcasting such a signal, would be committing a war crime.
Perfect? Hardly. But state actors would generally obey the rules. Non-state actors are not addressed by the laws of war and might not - but then again they might equally well shoot at a plane regardless of all the correct crypto codes that it broadcasts. So you're left with the rather small case of non-state actors flying a plane that claims to be innocent but is not. Of course, whatever system you might have had in place, the planes that were flown into buildings on 9/11 *were* legitimate civilian airliners, and would have been broadcasting legitimate codes.
If you think back at the real shoot-downs that were false positives - and non-shoot-downs that were false negatives (i.e., apparently legitimate planes that were used for attacks) - you'll see that the false positives were much more frequent. In fact, I can't off-hand think of *any* false negatives: 9/11 doesn't qualify since I know of no evidence that anyone spotted the planes (even the one headed for the Pentagon), selected it as a target, but then decided to leave it alone it because it was a civilian airliner.
Yes, civilian planes could use some more protection - they aren't shot down all *that* often, but it's still way more often than it should be. Almost all of the problem could be addressed fairly quickly and effectively by diplomacy and treaties - which a crypto solution would need *anyway*.
-- Jerry
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