[Cryptography] Terakey, An Encryption Method Whose Security Can Be Analyzed from First Principles

Peter Fairbrother peter at tsto.co.uk
Mon Aug 24 23:21:31 EDT 2020

On 07/08/2020 20:06, Arnold Reinhold via cryptography wrote:

> What you are proposing are active attacks. The security model I used in 
> my paper[1] for what I claim is a first-principles proof of 
> confidentially is based on a passive attack. 

"A" (singular) passive attack. I won't get into that.

But you don't have to defend against "a passive attack" - at a minimum 
you have to defend against all _plausible_ attacks, whether passive or 
active; or better, defend against all *possible* attacks.

Now suppose you deploy a system which defends against passive attacks 
only. Is it certain - certain - that it will never be used in a 
situation where an active attack is possible?

If you answer yes, at a minimum you abuse the dictum that a US Marine 
can break anything.

Analysing your cryptosystem from first principles? - I guess it is 
analysable: it is broken.

Peter Fairbrother

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