[Cryptography] TRNGs as open source design semiconductors
Bill Frantz
frantz at pwpconsult.com
Fri Sep 13 20:24:31 EDT 2019
On 9/13/19 at 4:25 PM, bear at sonic.net (Ray Dillinger) wrote:
>Anyway, this is why standard design combines many sources, in such a
>way that for every set of attackers who might possibly be able to
>predict one source assuming whatever skulduggery and conspiracy would
>be needed to subvert it, there exists at least one source which that
>attacker can't predict.
There is one good thing about secure random number generators
(or whatever is the PC term for them these days). If you use a
good combining function and your attacker can successfully
predice 7 of your 8 sources, but not the 8th, then you have good
output. There aren't many things in this world where you combine
7 bad things with 1 good thing and get a good thing.
Good combining functions are an interesting question, although I
still think that cryptographically secure hashes are a good choice.
Cheers - Bill
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