[Cryptography] Side chain, main chain, or everybody's in the pool

Dan Kolis dankolis at gmail.com
Mon Nov 11 16:34:10 EST 2019




The document lacks detail... it's somewhat more of an opinion then

However, that's fine, actions start with intents:

I made a toy blockchain app for a immigration consulting company and the
project disintegrated even before it really started. But when I got to the
HASH ticket for block chain insertions it occurred to me a way to verify
ledgers is made the submission on a node impossible without proving maybe
15:1 other ones in a package. And have those maybe triplicated randomly. So
by frustrating the forward progress of the submission, insiders needs to
find the evil acts or boo boos... This way hundreds of millions of people
could get paid in a dist. leger in a given day and take no miners or
central computing. It would slow down each person, maybe 45 seconds on a

My thought was a ( for example ) an I.M.F. throw in for currencies using
the equity unit called the S.D.R. and when a citizen "gets it" they can't
convert it to spendable without an 'in your pocket' verification of a shard.

I mention this because the paper says: ". checked by miners..." then "check
by anybody a little here and there.

I went to a Toronto sort of think tank which GULP spent $10 MIliion US of
taxpayer money to buy into fb libra. With VISA AMEX etc in there with fb,
the vows its all for the little man and common god, a non profit, is a bit
of a tall story to me. But ok. Im not sure If i think ( Im in Toronto )
this throw in is in the public interest. Maybe...

Anyway 'solve this puzzle or you get nothing' is an alternative to .gas
isn't it

If anybody wants the source code for the toy app let me know here, or

friend me at fb I think, send me a message or something. Dan Kolis.

Don't forget to have fun, whatever you all do daily

Regards to all,
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