[Cryptography] What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible?
Dennis E. Hamilton
dennis.hamilton at acm.org
Fri Nov 30 23:04:16 EST 2018
-----Original Message-----
From: cryptography <cryptography-bounces+dennis.hamilton=acm.org at metzdowd.com>
On Behalf Of Ondrej Mikle
Sent: Friday, November 30, 2018 15:12
[ ... ]
Sorry for piggy-backing on this, but I have one question that I have never had
answered (US, EU jurisdictions mainly):
How is it possible or what is the reason/judicature/excuse for law enforcement
to try to get into your phone/notebook to get all your data just for anything
you might be accused of? It kind of feels like unreasonable search.
I.e. for law enforcement to use all kinds of vendors to exploit a bug on your
phone to get all of your the data, generally not even related to the case.
[orcmid]
- - - - - - - - - - - -
I'll hazard two things about this.
1. When there was no expectation of privacy, this kind of searching could
potentially be without requirement of a warrant and not run across limitations
on search, seizure, and rules of evidence. There are still questions of
reasonable cause, but ...
2. For encrypted phones, there is no question about expectations of privacy
and now rules for searches and seizures and warrants come into play. If there
is a back-door system, legitimate use of it could well require a warrant to
achieve unlocking and undertaking search for warrant-authorized purpose. It
would be like any warrant. If television dramas and police procedural novels
are taken as realistic, there is room for some gamesmanship around excludible
evidence.
How one prevents illegitimate use -- lawless behavior -- by any parties, in
law-enforcement or elsewhere, is still a concern.
- Dennis
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