[Cryptography] Komitments

Phillip Hallam-Baker phill at hallambaker.com
Tue Dec 18 16:12:29 EST 2018


On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 1:06 PM Richard Clayton <richard at highwayman.com>
wrote:

> In message <CAMm+LwjCHWDRpCot4Q=xDgS12y0EDTt8thHONWs+JCqKyo7y5g at mail.gma
> il.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill at hallambaker.com> writes
>
> >I am sure this has been done before, just didn't see it in the books I
> >looked at.
>
> Anderson et al's "Guy Fawkes Protocol" seems relevant here
>
>         https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/fawkes.pdf
>
>
Certainly relevant and 20 years old to boot. I like 20 year old papers.

The problem they are solving is rather more complicated as the message is
published and it is the identity of the publisher that is concealed. So
that opens up a whole line of attack that I think I can avoid.

But what I will probably do is to present my protocol solving the simpler
problem first and then show how changing the problem very slightly
introduces a vulnerability into the system. Thus demonstrating that
security by analogy is a really risky and unsafe approach. Back in the day,
Ameritrade had a four digit PIN as the password on their Internet brokerage
accounts because if that is good enough for an ATM... oops.

The hash chain protocol then gives a bridge for talking about BitCoin and
such.
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