[Cryptography] the crypto wars never end

Tom Mitchell mitch at niftyegg.com
Mon Aug 27 13:49:52 EDT 2018


On Mon, Aug 27, 2018 at 9:51 AM John Denker via cryptography <
cryptography at metzdowd.com> wrote:

> In case you missed it:
>
> https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-encryption-exclusive/u-s-government-seeks-facebook-help-to-wiretap-messenger-sources-idUSKBN1L226D
>
> «The U.S. government is trying to force Facebook Inc (FB.O) to break the
> encryption in its popular Messenger app so law enforcement may listen to a
> suspect’s voice conversations in a criminal probe, three people briefed on
> the case said, resurrecting the issue of whether companies can be compelled
> to alter their products to enable surveillance. »
>

To make such a change is an international change.
What in the order protects from other government demands for the same
service.
To insert a flaw would aid and abet a foreign nation  and not defend the
nation from enemies, foreign and domestic.

Phone taps have anchors in the law.  "Like a phone tap" is not a phone tap
and is likely not covered by the law.  The law has not been altered...   In
fact the hot line to Russia had protections from tampering in the law if I
recall.

Infrastructure to do this  is not free.
What keeps FB from abusing it?
The cryptographic bit is likely to require FB to insert a man in the middle
attack flaw with a FB or FFBI resource in the middle.  Any weakening of
systems to enable a man in the middle act enables North Korea, Iran, drug
king controlled nations to exploit or detect a non FB resource.   Point to
point connection hacks are detectable.   Any time my location services
tells Amazon I am three time zones away from reality I wonder. If I am not
paranoid I see a massive tech challenge.  Location services are a safety
issue and I carry a cell for safety issues, for self  and others.
-- 
Tinny keyboard.. Mobile ... I am
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20180827/32ccaeeb/attachment.html>


More information about the cryptography mailing list