[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Escrowing keys

[Peter Gutmann]

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill at hallambaker.com> writes:

>In their world it isn't
>
>Confidentiality Integrity Availability
>
>It is:
>
>Confidentiality << Integrity < Availability

I would say it's more:

Availability && ( Integrity >> Confidentiality )

with the '&&' in the shell-script sense, i.e. first you ensure availability,
then once that's done you move on to any other stuff.  Sean Smith gives a
great example in his newest book of a vendor who advertises that their
hardcoded default password is more complex than other vendors'.  This make
sense, you don't want availability impacted by lack of access, but if you've
got a hardcoded default password then making it complex protects you from
endless random scanning attacks, you have to actually perform a targeted
attack to get in.

(I'm sure several readers' heads will have exploded trying to think that one
through :-).

Peter.