[Cryptography] Checkoin: physical crypto-cash

[Camille Harang]

Hi all, it seems that this answer wasn't delivered, I post it again.

Thanks,

Camille.


-------- Message transféré --------
Sujet : 	Re: [Cryptography] Checkoin: physical crypto-cash
Date : 	Mon, 17 Jul 2017 01:19:13 +0200
De : 	Camille Harang <mammique at garbure.org>
Pour : 	cryptography at metzdowd.com



Hi Ray, thank you for your reply and questions.

All the techniques you talk about are great, they can be added into the
second layer of verification to enforce it. The cash you are talking
about had no intrinsic value while the one proposed by Checkoin carries
it inside the packaging, it is not an arbitrary promise from a
government, you have it in your hand (cold storage crypto-wallet, gold
nugget, etc.). The cash you talk about is centralized, there is no
economical freedom, everyone is dependent of a central bank, with
Checkoin anyone can start to produce banknotes with intrinsic value, and
anyone on earth can accept them safely with one simple scan, even if
they see it for the first time. Cash is disappearing, banks and
governments are at war on cash, because they can track it, they want
everyone to use Visa and MasterCard, cash protects our privacy, if
governments kills cash, we'll have to produce our own decentralized
cash, here is the technology to do it. Checkoin is not only about cash,
but about many counterfeiting use cases (medicine, rare stamps, organic
seeds, artwork, etc.), it provides them anti-counterfeiting capabilities
at the same time as it allows them to be used as a medium of exchange
(like cash, as the application displays their integrity along with
real-time marketplace value). These are not really more expensive to
produce than central banks' cash, not to say the same (even microchips
produced in large series can be very cheap).

Here is what I think about right now at the top of my head regarding
your question, does it answer it?

Thanks again for taking the time to look at the project,

Camille.


Le 17/07/2017 à 00:12, Ray Dillinger a écrit :
>
> If the anti-duplicating measures work, why are we assuming that they are
> better than those already applied to cash?
>
> Cash already has the anti-counterfeiting measures built into banknotes,
> already including holograms and fine-detail-random images in some
> countries, probably to include RFIDs and cryptographic
> challenge/response if and when it becomes cost-effective.
>
> Cash already has the way banks detect duplication by tracking serial
> numbers on higher-denomination currency.
>
> Cash has the "tattletail" code in printers that puts identifying marks
> on pages so documents including counterfeits can be linked to the
> printer that made them.
>
> Cash has the code in scanners and printers that detects attempts to
> print currency and smudges the copy (and may send encrypted packets to
> interesting places if connected).
>
> Cash has existing police forces all over the world who recognize it, who
> understand what counterfeiting is and why it is bad.
>
> Cash has entire populations of people who already know exactly how it
> looks and feels and what weight and texture it has.  The kid at the
> fast-food place can routinely make a test with her eyes and fingertips
> in a fraction of a second that a counterfeiter needs many weeks of work
> to reliably overcome.  You will never get a more reliable test that fast
> and easy.
>
> You're looking for physical tokens of value to circulate with
> anti-duplication measures? The ratio of general effectiveness to very
> low cost is set by cash.  It's really very effective and very cheap to
> produce and use, and will likely continue to take up new technology as
> it becomes cost-effective.  It will be hard to convince anyone you have
> a better solution.  It will be hard to build a better solution.
>
> 					Bear
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> The cryptography mailing list
> cryptography at metzdowd.com
> http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20170719/187ac104/attachment.html>