[Cryptography] Bitcoin theft and the future of cryptocurrencies

[jamesd at echeque.com]

On 12/29/2017 1:54 PM, jamesd at echeque.com wrote:
>> > Suppose HHitler puts a wallet address on his website, and asks for
>> > donations.
> 
> On 12/28/2017 4:55 AM, John Tromp wrote:
>> Mimblewimble doesn't have public addresses.
>> See 
>> https://github.com/ignopeverell/grin/blob/master/doc/grin4bitcoiners.md

Oops, ignore my previous question.

The white paper you link to above tells me:

#	no address. All outputs in Grin are unique and have
#	no common data with any previous output. Instead of
#	relying on a known address to send money, transactions
#	have to be built interactively, with 2 (or more) wallets
#	exchanging data with one another. Practically, this
#	isn't so much of a problem as there are multiple ways
#	for 2 programs to interact privately and securely.
#	And this interaction could even take place over email
#	or Signal (or carrier pigeons).

Sounds good.

For example, suppose each peer has a thousand client wallets, and the 
capacity to connect to any other peer, that peers have fully accessible 
ports, and that the client wallets, who being behind consumer grade NATS 
generally do not have fully accessible ports, set up a direct client 
wallet encrypted connection through their NATS using their peer 
connections to initialize the connection.

But obviously this software is not written yet.  Still vaporware, but 
vaporware that sounds very promising.

Mimblewimble solves the problem of disk storage limiting scale.

How does it go on bandwidth limiting scale?