[Cryptography] Secure erasure

[Ralf Senderek]

On Sun, 11 Sep 2016, Jerry Leichter wrote:

>>> Until the attackers move there, no one will pay for the defenses.
>>
>> I have difficulties following this logic. Because if you continue to keep
>> traditional OSes insecure, which isn't very unlikely, easy attacks remain
>> and no-one will want (or pay for) a secure system?

> The argument is:  No one will pay for special compiler modes, special
> code in OS's, special hardware support, all to carefully route around
> optimizations that may, as a side effect, in special circumstances,
> cause data to leak - when that's not a leakage path that anyone is likely
> to actually attack, because much easier ones exist.

Jerry, I understand that argument, but I don't believe it.
The misconception here is the assumption that an attacker can gain
the same information easily as well as by subverting the security
additions.

You know that I speak in favour of a *separation* (normal,buggy
user machine vs separate. well-designed less vulnerable personal
security server) and here the information an attacker can gain is
considerably restricted compared with what can be exfiltrated if
everything happens on the (ONE) traditional device.

Anyway, the IBM/VAX story is well worth to be told (twice).
I just cannot figure out in what way it'll support your argument,
other than that it's crucial for the *separate device* to not
leave anything to chance, as much as this is possible.


      --ralf