[Cryptography] "Flip Feng Shui: Hammering a Needle in the Software Stack"

[Florian Weimer]

* Jeff Burdges:

> On Fri, 2016-09-02 at 07:52 +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> Why bother with patching public keys, making them amenable to
>> factorization, if you can patch executable code instead?
>> 
>> If you can target executable code (and I see why not, it's all the
>> same to KSM), it is very clear that there cannot be a software-only
>> defense.  (The authors try to frame this as a software problem which
>> needs fixes in GnuPG etc.)
>
> If your fault is random, then targeting the key is often more
> profitable, ala Lenstra's attack on RSA.

Do you mean Lenstra's attack on unverified CRT?  It targets RSA
signing operations, while the paper discusses an attack on RSA
signature verification.