[Cryptography] Use of RDRAND in Haskell's TLS RNG?

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Tue Nov 29 01:54:25 EST 2016

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 1:24 PM, Ray Dillinger <bear at sonic.net> wrote:
> On 11/23/2016 02:23 AM, Darren Moffat wrote:
>> What is a "proper audit" and why do you think that Intel hasn't done that
>> already ? What more find they (or any chip designer/builder) do to convince
>> you?
> A proper audit is one that's sufficient for anybody with a copy of the
> audit to notice if there's a mistake in the claimed implementation.
> publicly available so security researchers and random grad students
> anywhere in the world can inspect it, publish papers about it, freely
> quote it, etc. without need of an NDA and without worrying about getting
> If this document existed we'd know about it because researchers and grad
> would budget a whole lot of university research, would be publishing a
> firehose stream of papers about it.
> Full Verification involves decapping randomly selected chips that have
> been sold to the general public, and inspecting them under an electron
> Publishing the audit would be simple and easy.  We assume that document
> publish their findings. Nor, indeed, even admit they've done it.

Any recent processor from Intel has between 1B and 8B transistors.
Not a single modern processor from them has been publicly decapped
and audited.
Both Intel and the fabs they are built in are closed source.
And the NSA and others intercept your deliveries and backdoor
your microcode.
Audits... there, really? Trying to start with and prove out that mess?
LOL, you're fucked.

Instead of pouring yet another hundred messages into the quarterly
circle jerk about 'random', why not try figuring out how to create
something that might be worthy of some level of objective trust.


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