[Cryptography] "we need to protect [our dox] by at least encrypting them"

[Bill Frantz]

On 11/11/16 at 11:12 AM, agr at me.com (Arnold Reinhold) wrote:

>Optical scanners for paper ballots can detect over-votes at the 
>time of submission and return the paper ballot to the voter so 
>they can get it voided and try again. ( See 
>http://vote.nyc.ny.us/html/newway_en/faq.shtml 
><http://vote.nyc.ny.us/html/newway_en/faq.shtml> Faq #10) So 
>any over-voted ballot detected during later hand counting 
>should arouse suspicion, more than one alarm.  I assume that 
>when you were a child there were no scanners. But this rather 
>clever scheme was non the less detected. The skills needed to 
>figure out mischief with paper ballots are widely held, the 
>skills needed to discover problems in electronic systems are 
>far more scarce.

Our walk-in polling places do not scan the ballots while the 
voter is still there. The just put them in a ballot box. No 
chance for an automated reality check of a person's vote.

Cheers - Bill

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