[Cryptography] "we need to protect [our dox] by at least encrypting them"

Ray Dillinger bear at sonic.net
Wed Nov 9 13:54:57 EST 2016

On 11/09/2016 05:38 AM, Ian G wrote:

> And (b) we need to get away from this impossibility thing. Probability
> works for human systems, too.  If we can make it improbable that a vote
> is tampered with, that's still a win, for those times in the majority
> where we got the true positive.

There is a fairly simple protocol to solve a decent chunk of this
problem at a reasonable scale, using two parallel Hash Chains.  A
national election with 300M voters would require Merkle Trees instead,
but it's easily do-able.

If Trent wants to jigger the vote, Trent has to do it in real-time
rather than after the fact, by inserting additional bogus votes between
pairs of legitimate votes.  But in order for Trent to do that, a
conspiracy right to the highest levels must exist, issuing 'extra'
ballots with bogus IDs and faking their distribution to real voters -
and then the people inserting votes in realtime in the field must guess
correctly which voters are not going to vote in the time remaining
before the polls close, because any voters whose ballots do get replaced
would notice that verification fails because their real ballots are
missing from the Merkle trees.

One problem is that voters could prove to third parties afterward how
they voted, by proving the preimages match values they know from their
own ballot, opening up the possibility of vote selling or vote coercion.


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 801 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20161109/55435f37/attachment.sig>

More information about the cryptography mailing list