[Cryptography] TRNG related review: rngd and /dev/random

[Thierry Moreau]

On 20/01/16 01:37 AM, Bill Cox wrote:
>
> These problems are fixable.  Health monitors with good entropy
> estimators should be required for each entropy source.

Those who maintain the Linux kernel are not in a position to *require* 
either health monitors or good entropy estimators. The inclusion of an 
entropy source in a system is a decision that may be made even after the 
Linux distribution packaging.

> The result is that zero [entropy] was from the OneRNG!

Maybe you failed to fulfill the Linux distribution requirement for both 
health monitor and entropy estimator (pun intended). You may be 
confident in the OneRNG but how the Linux distribution specialists might 
be convinced?

I guess the process of trusted secret random source provisioning may not 
be delegated to O/S team.

- Thierry