[Cryptography] Plan to End the Crypto War

[Tom Mitchell]

On Fri, Jan 8, 2016 at 3:49 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz at pwpconsult.com> wrote:

> On 1/8/16 at 10:46 AM, hughejp at me.com (james hughes) wrote:
>
> My personal conjecture is that split golden key is no better than single
>> golden key because any human process where the split key works, that
>> process can be implemented around a single golden key.
>>
>
> One advantage a split key has is more security against insider attack. You
> need N of M insiders inorder to get at the data. If those insiders have to
> be inside different organizations, all the better.
>


Not singular "split golden key"  but plural this involves key pairs for
both ends of the conversations.
The interesting criminal cells would be larger than two and would likely be
anchored in
multiple jurisdictions.
Now if there was an Apple Golden Key after the first time the bits were
joined
it is unlikely that they would magically be split again.  As a minimum the
key
would reside in the evidence locker where any number of individuals would
have
access.

Any well connected individual could be used to reach out N degrees to force
the fragments from any service, maker, nation, .... to be assembled.

We are not talking physical objects where audit and replication are
understood.

Building many of these cases involves a duration of years further
complicating
management of the key or fragments.

And once keys are fully disclosed as some would like digital fraud is
possible.
The manufacture of evidence is a temptation.

The keys to the networks that would transmit the keys seem interesting for
bulk data collection and would yield more keys.

I cannot see how a Federal Marshal could handcuff a uSD card to his
hand and transport it.   Diplomatic pouches...








-- 
  T o m    M i t c h e l l
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