[Cryptography] Is glibc right on randomness

[Peter Gutmann]

John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> quotes:

>  If you want progress on this, take a lead in the general discussion
>  on libc-alpha of when glibc should provide bindings to Linux kernel
>  syscalls, seeking to understand the differences of views expressed,
>  find common ground and drive the discussion to consensus.  Once we
>  have agreed principles on bindings for syscalls, then we can
>  consider which new or old syscalls should have such bindings added
>  under those principles.

I think that what he's saying there is that everyone has agreed that this 
new policy is really an excellent plan. But in view of some of the doubts 
being expressed, may he propose that he recall that after careful 
consideration, the considered view of the glibc maintainers was that, while 
they considered that the proposal met with broad approval in principle, that 
some of the principles were sufficiently fundamental in principle, and some 
of the considerations so complex and finely balanced in practice that in 
principle it was proposed that the sensible and prudent practice would be 
to submit the proposal for more detailed consideration, laying stress on the 
essential continuity of the new proposal with existing principles, the 
principle of the principal arguments which the proposal proposes and 
propounds for their approval. In principle.

(joseph at codesourcery is a rank amateur compared to Sir Humphrey).

Peter.