[Cryptography] OpenSSL and random

[Nico Williams]

On Thu, Dec 01, 2016 at 09:42:59PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 01, 2016 at 06:39:46PM -0600, Nico Williams wrote:
> > It might be nice to be get an indication of entropy quality from the OS.
> > At minimum a boolean (true -> real entropy, false -> meh entropy).
> > _Perhaps_ also an indication of when was the last time new entropy was
> > stirred in.  (Anything more would be overkill and hard to use well.)
> 
> We do give such a an indication.   For example:
> 
> random: systemd: uninitialized urandom read (16 bytes read, 3 bits of entropy available)

I meant: in the API.  A dmesg does the app no good.

Python could use lame rng seeds for hash table randomization, note the
lameness, and reseed later when cryptographically-secure an rng is
needed.