[Cryptography] practical verifiable systems -- forensic and otherwise, cheap and otherwise

Bill Frantz frantz at pwpconsult.com
Wed Mar 4 17:29:41 EST 2015

On 3/3/15 at 6:59 PM, jthorn at astro.indiana.edu (Jonathan 
Thornburg) wrote:

>In contrast, hacking an electronic system can attack the count across the
>entire election.

I like two independent mechanisms which are compared, rather 
than depending on just one. If an electronic system is 
miscounting a large number of precincts, then an audit of 
randomly chosen after the election precincts is quite likely to 
catch the electronic systems miscount.

If we are looking at a local election, or a close national 
election, like the first George W. Bush election, then it 
doesn't take many individual attackers to successfully attack an 
unaudited system. I think polling is good enough to know which 
precincts will allow attackers to be the most effective.

Cheers - Bill

Bill Frantz        | There are now so many exceptions to the
408-356-8506       | Fourth Amendment that it operates only by
www.pwpconsult.com | accident.  -  William Hugh Murray

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