[Cryptography] practical verifiable systems -- forensic and otherwise, cheap and otherwise
Bill Frantz
frantz at pwpconsult.com
Wed Mar 4 17:29:41 EST 2015
On 3/3/15 at 6:59 PM, jthorn at astro.indiana.edu (Jonathan
Thornburg) wrote:
>In contrast, hacking an electronic system can attack the count across the
>entire election.
I like two independent mechanisms which are compared, rather
than depending on just one. If an electronic system is
miscounting a large number of precincts, then an audit of
randomly chosen after the election precincts is quite likely to
catch the electronic systems miscount.
If we are looking at a local election, or a close national
election, like the first George W. Bush election, then it
doesn't take many individual attackers to successfully attack an
unaudited system. I think polling is good enough to know which
precincts will allow attackers to be the most effective.
Cheers - Bill
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