[Cryptography] Anti-clipper team re-assembles

[Salz, Rich]

> This is all a smokescreen.

I am sorry you feel that way.  The risk that the government will do something bad that results in less global security is a very real one: they've done it before, they've tried to do it before, and they're clearly trying to do it again.  For examples, look at export ciphers, recent Wassenar, Clipper, software as a munition, etc.

> Passwords of insufficient entropy should be a larger concern.

It doesn't matter how good your password is, if HTTPS isn't really secure.

I never thought that I would use the Satayana quote: those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Damn, I'm old.
 
	/r$
--  
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz at jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz