[Cryptography] Wrong uses of filesystem encryption

U.Mutlu for-gmane at mutluit.com
Fri Jan 30 10:33:50 EST 2015

I think that most of the filesystem crypto users don't really know
that their crypto strategy offers them no security or protection at all.

For example:
1) someone steals all your encrypted files (incl. the key file)
2) someone steals (or seizes) your HD, or the whole computer

How do the current solutions protect against these scenarios
if the perpetrator/bigbrother has somehow hacked the system
user password, so he can login to the system, and thereby
gets automatically access to the encrypted filesystems since
most of them automatically mount...?

I think these auto-mounting people don't really know what they do, do they?

What 'best practices' for filesystem encryption are there?


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