[Cryptography] traffic analysis

Ben Laurie benl at google.com
Tue Jan 27 15:23:27 EST 2015

On 27 January 2015 at 18:35, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:

> Different network designs can also help.  If you own the link and both of
> its ends, it costs you exactly the same to send continuous random bits as
> to leave the line idle.  Any encrypted traffic (assuming an encryptor whose
> output is indistinguishable from random noise() is then safe from
> observation.  The Hot Line between the US and Moscow was, I believe,
> designed to work this way.  How this extends to a packet-switched network,
> especially one where you can't trust the switches, is unclear.

Yeah, but ... who can realistically afford that bandwidth? To every
possible recipient? Clearly you have to make a tradeoff.
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