[Cryptography] traffic analysis
Ben Laurie
benl at google.com
Tue Jan 27 15:23:27 EST 2015
On 27 January 2015 at 18:35, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:
> Different network designs can also help. If you own the link and both of
> its ends, it costs you exactly the same to send continuous random bits as
> to leave the line idle. Any encrypted traffic (assuming an encryptor whose
> output is indistinguishable from random noise() is then safe from
> observation. The Hot Line between the US and Moscow was, I believe,
> designed to work this way. How this extends to a packet-switched network,
> especially one where you can't trust the switches, is unclear.
>
Yeah, but ... who can realistically afford that bandwidth? To every
possible recipient? Clearly you have to make a tradeoff.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20150127/874c73b7/attachment.html>
More information about the cryptography
mailing list