[Cryptography] asymmetric attacks on crypto-protocols - the rough consensus attack

[ianG]

On 3/08/2015 22:33 pm, Jerry Leichter wrote:

> (Note that it *may* be the case that there are genuinely two distinct audiences with different needs, and no one proposal can really satisfy both.  In that case, you may really not *want* there to be a single winner.  In some cases, providing two alternative approaches, each covering part of the space of application - with perhaps substantial overlap - may simply be the best you can do.)


I think I'm seeing the fallacy in my thought experiment.

My false assumption here is that the decision will succeed.  If we do a 
good job, prepare a good document, then profit and happiness will ensue.

Unfortunately that assumption is so far from useful that it is actually 
raises questions.

The crux of the difficulty comes down to this, I think:  The biggest 
issue by far is deployment of the protocol - how likely it is that the 
various erstwhile users of the protocol are going to pick it up, write 
it, deploy it.

Success in deployment is approximately an unknowable, a priori.  There 
are so many factors involved that from the group's perspective it is 
unpredictable.  We seriously are looking at from approximately 0% to 
approximately 100% without any real scientific tool that helps us further.

In effect, the factors that effect success of the efforts are outside 
the group's control.  And outside written requirements.  We can't 
"require" deployment.

But, the unwritten requirement is imposed on us - we still have to 
evaluate every proposal from the point of view of later deployment. 
Indeed, if I'm right, it is the most and only important criteria.  Even 
though it is unstated and cannot be stated.

Hence, this is fertile ground for two groups to do what you state - 
bifurcate on favourites, and only list the benefits of their choice. 
Because as soon as the get into the real question - which will deploy 
better - the useful question is withdrawn because we're crystal ball gazing.



iang