[Cryptography] upgrade mechanisms and policies

[Ryan Carboni]

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 6:16 AM, Benjamin Kreuter <brk7bx at virginia.edu>
wrote:

> On Wed, 2015-04-15 at 21:37 -0700, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> > I mean, for instance. Do you think this email should be encrypted, or
> > simply authentificated?
>
> Suppose a tyrant rises to power a few decades from now, and starts
> purging anyone who ever criticized him.  Suppose that tyrant is
> currently a local politician in your town.  You probably would regret
> sending unencrypted messages in which you call him a moron -- even more
> so if the messages were authenticated.
>
> My point is that deciding what is "important enough to encrypt" is
> awfully difficult.  We should instead be focusing on reducing the costs
> and inconvenience of encryption, so that we do not have to sit around
> wondering whether or not something is "worth encrypting."  This is
> nothing new but we have a long way to go and progress has been a bit
> slow.
>


OH NO, I MUST GET THE LIST MODERATOR TO PUT UP A ROBOTS.TXT FILE IN CASE
THAT HAPPENS
https://web.archive.org/web/20150416191405/http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-April/date.html

When 99% of the data you receive is a known plaintext, you are going to
have to deal with several trade-offs.
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