[Cryptography] Cryptography for consensual sex in California ?

[ianG]

On 30/09/2014 06:57 am, Henry Baker wrote:
> With California's new "yes means yes" law, how would you design a protocol for engaging in consensual sex, which would authenticate the parties' consents, which protected their privacy, but which couldn't be subsequently repudiated ?


I've been working on something similar.  The problem faced here is that
the fact you are resting on "yes means yes" is not a fact that can be
measured by tech for a variety of reasons.  Assuming that, the task is
to capture what facts you can capture and save it for later review by a
human.

In my threat model, we are faced with intimate aggression delivered over
an IM/chat channel.  So we've decided to add a mode that BCC's the
messages encrypted to an arbitrator.  If a person is unsure about the
situation, then she can hit the BCC button and carry on.  If/when a
dispute arises on any question, the transcript can be pulled out,
decrypted and become part of the evidence for fact finding.


> This Good2Go app obviously doesn't satisfy any of these requirements, but it isn't so obvious how to design a protocol that would.
> 
> http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/09/29/352482932/california-enacts-yes-means-yes-law-defining-sexual-consent
> 
> http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/09/29/good2go_a_new_app_for_consenting_to_sex.html


That's the sort of design you expect from foundation or grant money...



iang