[Cryptography] Billboard Defense and CT

[Arnold Reinhold]

On Sep 29, 2014, at 1:38 PM, Henry Baker <hbaker1 at pipeline.com> wrote:

> Good idea!  Like the BBC in WWII going on for 30 minutes with completely bizarre instructions for various spies.
> 
> However, be aware the all modern "digital billboards" are accessible (aka hackable) via the Internet.
> 
> Also, note those stupid ads taken out by attys for trademark preservation in the back of newspapers that aren't read by anyone.
> 
> Speaking of "trademark", isn't name trust the province of the US trademark office?
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trademark
> 
> Surely, one can find a model in various trademark cases about how to establish trademarks & resolve trademark disputes?

The BBC in WWII was mostly using one time codes, otherwise, I suspect that, at least with modern tech, the broadcasts could have been MITM'd. A local transmitter could overwhelm the distant broadcast and a half hearted attempt at jamming could cover up any artifacts. Matching voices would have been the tricky part, easier to do today.

The advantage of a flashing light beacon on a landmark building, like Google's 111 8th Ave., or the Citibank building, or the Bank of America tower in San Francisco, is that both the owner's identity and the message content can be perceived and trusted directly without any electronic intervention. While knowledge of Morse code is not as widespread as it used to be (the Boy Scouts used to teach it), if the transmission speed is slow enough it can be copied down as dots and dashes and looked up in a table. There is no place for a man in the middle to operate. The totally-ignored fate of legal notices could be avoided by having the beacon transmit other messages that would keep the public interested, such as consumer discount codes.  

Trademarks are directly relevant to domain names and there are many other examples besides the Trademark Office of governments providing useful managed identity information services, deed registries, passports, driver's licenses, etc. Unfortunately few of us are willing to trust the government with verifying our keys. Hence the need for an absolutely trustworthy, independent way to communicate key verification data.

Arnold Reinhold