[Cryptography] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency

[Greg]

On Sep 27, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Greg <greg at kinostudios.com> wrote:

> Currently, nothing in the CT proposal detects these MITM attacks, before, during, or after they happen.

(*that is, nothing automatically detects the attacks. As explained in prior emails, Monitors could query all of the logs and search all of them for mis-issued certs, and that's problematic for reasons previously explained.)

Sorry for all the followups. Please read the entire thread next time.

- Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

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