[Cryptography] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency

[Greg]

On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:14 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com> wrote:

> Nothing you just said has anything to do with the question at hand: what happens when the latest tree in the log is incongruent with the old one.
> 
> I'd allege: CT should detect that and suggest something is amiss.

Um, OK, that is not the attack being described though.

> And, again, it's no different than Namecoin detecting a fork in the block chain. What does Namecoin do in that case? What actionable information does it present to the user.


Forks are protected against by PoW. It is automatic. If the connection is completely censored, and they are shown only a false fork that the MITM is making, that has already been brought up and addressed by myself and Bear in previous emails.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

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