[Cryptography] The Trouble with Certificate Transparency

[Greg]

On Sep 27, 2014, at 11:53 AM, Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com> wrote:

> My understanding is CT would detect the attack when it's over.

As explained in several places now, it does not provide any such guarantees:

- Earlier in this thread.
- http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/trans/current/msg00588.html
- https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000873.html

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

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