[Cryptography] Fwd: [tor-talk] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network

Robert Hettinga hettinga at gmail.com
Thu Nov 27 06:44:02 EST 2014

> Begin forwarded message:
> Date: November 27, 2014 at 6:26:17 AM AST
> From: Mirimir <mirimir at riseup.net>
> To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network
> Reply-To: tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
> On 11/27/2014 01:13 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>> http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/18679
>> Biryukov, Khovratovich, Pustogarov
>> Nov-2014
> <SNIP>
>> different users behind the same NAT. We also show that a natural
>> countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off
>> by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the bitcoin network. Our
>> attacks require only a few machines and have been experimentally
>> verified. We propose several countermeasures to mitigate these new
>> attacks.
> Well "abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the bitcoin network" here
> involves hitting every Bitcoin server with malformed messages from every
> Tor exit. Not at all elegant ;)
> But even so, people using Bitcoin clients via Tor are safe as long as
> they resist the temptation to connect directly when Tor is cut off.
> The paper is at <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.7418v2.pdf>.
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