[Cryptography] Tamper-evident cryptographic systems

[dan at geer.org]

 | <snip>
 | Perry resurrected this list after a long hiatus with the challenge to =
 | develop new systems secure again such attacks.  I think we have some =
 | idea how to accomplish this kind of thing.  But ... one thing we really =
 | must learn from the Snowden experience is that even apparently secure =
 | systems can be attacked by a well-funded, motivated attacker.  You can't =
 | just introduce a new system and walk away saying "it's done".  You also =
 | need an active defense.
 | <snip>
 | So ... how might one build "tamper evident cryptographic systems"?  Are =
 | there collections of sensitive signals of possible attacks that can be =
 | tracked to provide an early warning - even if no individual signal has a =
 | sufficiently low false positive/false negative rate?  Are there ways to =
 | construct "honey pots" that will attract attackers to systems specially =
 | configured to notice they are there?
 | <snip>
 | Suggestions?


For me, the pinnacle goal in security engineering, the ne plus ultra,
the goal beyond which there is no other, is this:

  No Silent Failure

I, for one, would readily settle for many more failures if such
failure rate is hedged with their never being silent.  With this,
I break conclusively with Postel's Rule.

--dan