[Cryptography] Client certificates as a defense against MITM attacks

Jerry Leichter leichter at lrw.com
Mon Mar 17 18:16:28 EDT 2014

On Mar 17, 2014, at 5:00 PM, Nico Williams <nico at cryptonector.com> wrote:
>> An HTML cookie isn't bound to the end-to-end connection context.  A MITM simply passes it through.  The signed information I'm suggesting the client send *is* bound to that context, and isn't subject to this trivial vulnerability.
> https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final162.pdf
Yup.  The same idea.  The details are a bit different (and their approach may be more general) but fundamentally I'm proposing the same thing they did.

I guess the time comes when some ideas are just ready to be found.

Thanks for the reference.
                                                        -- Jerry

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