[Cryptography] Can Google's new "End to End" leak plaintext via the DOM? [was: Re: [liberationtech] Mailvelope: OpenPGP Encryption for Webmail]

[StealthMonger]

Uncle Zzzen <unclezzzen at gmail.com> writes:

> The reason why FireGPG no longer ships with tails is that the DOM of a web
> app is not a safe place for plaintext
> https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/FireGPG_susceptible_to_devastating_attacks/
> Any architecture where plaintext is stored inside a web app's DOM is
> dangerous. Especially a webmail app that can be expected to save drafts,
> but not only. Web apps can be MITMed, XSSed, etc. If it came via the web,
> it's a suspect.

> I'd expect a crypto add-on to only accept plaintext (and other sensitive)
> information via separate GUI that can only be launched manually (not via
> javascript in an app's DOM) and has a hard-to-imitate look-and-feel (to
> discourage phishing). The only communication between this add-on and the
> rest of the browser should be via the clipboard. Users who can't handle
> copy/paste shouldn't be trusted with a key pair :)

A prominent new entry in OpenPGP encrypted webmail is Google's
"end-to-end" [1,2].  Does it avoid this issue?  How?

[1] https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/
[2] http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html

-- 


 -- StealthMonger
    Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity.


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