[Cryptography] HSM's

[Thierry Moreau]

John Kelsey wrote:
>> On Jan 19, 2014, at 2:49 PM, Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau at connotech.com> wrote:
>>
> ...
>> A final note: Anyone aware of an HSM vendor that did not follow NIST advice in their engineering? Maybe the HSM concept is just dead after the Snowden revelations.
> 
> I'm sure you can find some HSM out there that uses single-DES or a homegrown cipher instead of AES, MD5 instead of SHA1 or SHA2, 768-bit RSA keys, etc.  So, yeah, I'm sure you can find someone who will sell you an HSM that ignores NIST recommendations.   
> 

Good joke!

"Industry best practice" suffices for avoiding known weak algorithms and 
crypto parameter sizes, given a knowledgeable customer organization.

Also thanks for pointing to the vagueness of my previous post. Let me 
attempt to clarify.

NIST-independent HSMs could aim at certification per

CEN WORKSHOP AGREEMENT, "Security Requirements for Trustworthy Systems 
Managing Certificates for Electronic Signatures - Part 1: System 
Security Requirements" CWA 14167-1, June 2003 (and other parts and 
related documents).

My original question hinted at a very very small market for this idea of 
a NIST-independent HSM.

NIST-independent HSM designed and build at arms' length with the US 
jurisdiction might be less subject to NSA backdoors. Obviously I'm just 
speculating with these words but you might see my point.

Regards,

- Thierry Moreau