[Cryptography] The ultimate random source

Philip Gladstone pjsg-cryptography at nospam.gladstonefamily.net
Tue Feb 18 12:42:49 EST 2014

On 2/18/14, 11:45 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> One important boundary condition is that I want the operation of the
> random number generator to be completely auditable so that we can tell
> with a very high degree of confidence that no strange business has
> taken place.
> So for example, lets take a cut and choose type protocol.
> What I want is a machine that I can cause to perform the random number
> acquisition process repeatedly without knowing whether the machine
> itself is being audited or not. So we have the dice roll in a
> transparent box 256 times and one one occasion chosen using a process
> that could not be predicted when the machine is configured we put a
> cover over the camera so the dice rolls are not observed.
> We check that the results are consistent with the observations from
> the second camera in the other 255 cases. Thus an occasional defection
> attack has only a 1 in 256 chance (i.e. 8 bits) of success.
Where does the random number come from that indicates which of the rolls 
is not observed? I suspect that you are just moving the problem around....


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