[Cryptography] cheap sources of entropy
James A. Donald
Jamesd at echeque.com
Mon Feb 3 18:05:10 EST 2014
On 2014-02-04 07:13, Tom Mitchell wrote:
> Go back to the paper that proposed using turbulence and repeat
> some of their tests in a virtual environment. Let us know what
> you *actually observe*.
They made everything artificially simple - because otherwise there are
so many sources of timing randomness that you could not distinguish the
turbulence induced timing randomness.
If you look at timing in a complex system, it looks random.
To conclude that something that looks random truly is random, you have
to understand and measure the underlying causes of randomness.
To isolate and identify /one/ such source of randomness, required them
to artificially constrain the system in a way that was not realistic,
nor intended to be realistic.
So their argument, in essence was that when they took all these
extremely drastic measures to make timing of events predictable, timing
of events was /still/ not predictable due to underlying physical processes.
From which we may confidently conclude that in more complex situations,
timing will be less predictable, not more predictable, because we have
more sources of randomness, many poorly characterized sources of
randomness interacting with other sources of randomness, /one/ of which
is well characterized.
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