[Cryptography] GHCQ Penetration of Belgacom

[ianG]

On 21/12/2014 02:56 am, dan at geer.org wrote:
> hbaker1 writes:
>   | >From: dan at geer.org
>   | >
>   | > | I think it would be very hard to find a backdoor suggested by
>   | > | Norm Hardy.  Modify the CPU to detect when two specific floating
>   | > | point numbers are multiplied.  When they are, execute the next
>   | > | instruction in privileged mode.
>   | >
>   | >It's my second-hand understanding that it would take perhaps 3,000
>   | >gates to implement intentional sensitivity to a pre-designed kill
>   | >packet.  The addition of 3,000 gates to any current chipset will
>   | >never be found in current hardware, e.g., the iPhone 6 has two
>   | >billion transistors on the system chip.
>   | >
>   | >Others more knowledgeable welcome to correct my understanding.
...
> Nevertheless, to reword in the interest of clarity, hiding something in
> hardware is, AND ALWAYS WILL BE, impossible to detect or disprove.


How about dual-sourcing through mutual enemies?  E.g., use a China fab 
and a fab run by the dalai lama.  Or a Russian one and a Chechen one.

Then, sample the chips, open them up, and test whether the tracks / 
layout are the same as each other?

(I have no idea if such a technique for reading the chip like that 
exists...)


iang