[Cryptography] GHCQ Penetration of Belgacom
iang at iang.org
Sun Dec 21 11:34:32 EST 2014
On 21/12/2014 02:56 am, dan at geer.org wrote:
> hbaker1 writes:
> | >From: dan at geer.org
> | >
> | > | I think it would be very hard to find a backdoor suggested by
> | > | Norm Hardy. Modify the CPU to detect when two specific floating
> | > | point numbers are multiplied. When they are, execute the next
> | > | instruction in privileged mode.
> | >
> | >It's my second-hand understanding that it would take perhaps 3,000
> | >gates to implement intentional sensitivity to a pre-designed kill
> | >packet. The addition of 3,000 gates to any current chipset will
> | >never be found in current hardware, e.g., the iPhone 6 has two
> | >billion transistors on the system chip.
> | >
> | >Others more knowledgeable welcome to correct my understanding.
> Nevertheless, to reword in the interest of clarity, hiding something in
> hardware is, AND ALWAYS WILL BE, impossible to detect or disprove.
How about dual-sourcing through mutual enemies? E.g., use a China fab
and a fab run by the dalai lama. Or a Russian one and a Chechen one.
Then, sample the chips, open them up, and test whether the tracks /
layout are the same as each other?
(I have no idea if such a technique for reading the chip like that
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