[Cryptography] GHCQ Penetration of Belgacom

[Henry Baker]

At 06:56 PM 12/20/2014, dan at geer.org wrote:
>hbaker1 writes:
> | >From: dan at geer.org
> | >
> | > | I think it would be very hard to find a backdoor suggested by 
> | > | Norm Hardy.  Modify the CPU to detect when two specific floating 
> | > | point numbers are multiplied.  When they are, execute the next 
> | > | instruction in privileged mode.
> | >
> | >It's my second-hand understanding that it would take perhaps 3,000
> | >gates to implement intentional sensitivity to a pre-designed kill
> | >packet.  The addition of 3,000 gates to any current chipset will
> | >never be found in current hardware, e.g., the iPhone 6 has two
> | >billion transistors on the system chip.
> | >
> | >Others more knowledgeable welcome to correct my understanding.
> | 
> | So Intel&Apple have provided PRC with netlists for their processor
> | chips?
> | 
> | Of course, PRC shouldn't believe them, unless they could also
> | manufacture their own chips from the netlists.
>
>You missed the point well enough that it must have been on purpose.
>
>Nevertheless, to reword in the interest of clarity, hiding something in
>hardware is, AND ALWAYS WILL BE, impossible to detect or disprove.
>
>--dan

http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/semiconductors/devices/contracts_awarded_for_darpas_t

Posted 6 Dec 2007 | 12:36 GMT

"Trust, but verify.  ...  A year shy of its 50th birthday, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has launched the *** Trust in Integrated Circuits *** program, the goal of which is a microchip verification process.  It's basically a Pentagon Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.  A chip bearing the Trusted imprimatur will be *** guaranteed free of malicious content. ***"

I've been sleeping better ever since.