[Cryptography] GHCQ Penetration of Belgacom
hbaker1 at pipeline.com
Sun Dec 21 00:42:31 EST 2014
At 06:56 PM 12/20/2014, dan at geer.org wrote:
> | >From: dan at geer.org
> | >
> | > | I think it would be very hard to find a backdoor suggested by
> | > | Norm Hardy. Modify the CPU to detect when two specific floating
> | > | point numbers are multiplied. When they are, execute the next
> | > | instruction in privileged mode.
> | >
> | >It's my second-hand understanding that it would take perhaps 3,000
> | >gates to implement intentional sensitivity to a pre-designed kill
> | >packet. The addition of 3,000 gates to any current chipset will
> | >never be found in current hardware, e.g., the iPhone 6 has two
> | >billion transistors on the system chip.
> | >
> | >Others more knowledgeable welcome to correct my understanding.
> | So Intel&Apple have provided PRC with netlists for their processor
> | chips?
> | Of course, PRC shouldn't believe them, unless they could also
> | manufacture their own chips from the netlists.
>You missed the point well enough that it must have been on purpose.
>Nevertheless, to reword in the interest of clarity, hiding something in
>hardware is, AND ALWAYS WILL BE, impossible to detect or disprove.
Posted 6 Dec 2007 | 12:36 GMT
"Trust, but verify. ... A year shy of its 50th birthday, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has launched the *** Trust in Integrated Circuits *** program, the goal of which is a microchip verification process. It's basically a Pentagon Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. A chip bearing the Trusted imprimatur will be *** guaranteed free of malicious content. ***"
I've been sleeping better ever since.
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