[Cryptography] OneRNG kickstarter project looking for donations

ianG iang at iang.org
Tue Dec 16 11:39:11 EST 2014


Surprisingly, the OneRNG project is already half way to the goal of $10k 
NZD after only a week.

https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/moonbaseotago/onerng-an-open-source-entropy-generator

One reason I really like this project is that it is hopefully totally 
open.  If we can seed the world with open hardware designs, we can have 
a chance of leaking this project into all sorts of other things like 
home routers, IoT things, Bitcoin hardware wallets etc.

iang


On 15/12/2014 19:18 pm, ianG wrote:
> After Edward Snowden's recent revelations about how compromised our
> internet security has become some people have worried about whether the
> hardware we're using is compromised - is it? We honestly don't know, but
> like a lot of people we're worried about our privacy and security.
>
> What we do know is that the NSA has corrupted some of the random number
> generators in the OpenSSL software we all use to access the internet,
> and has paid some large crypto vendors millions of dollars to make their
> software less secure. Some people say that they also intercept hardware
> during shipping to install spyware.
>
> We believe it's time we took back ownership of the hardware we use day
> to day. This project is one small attempt to do that - OneRNG is an
> entropy generator, it makes long strings of random bits from two
> independent noise sources that can be used to seed your operating
> system's random number generator. This information is then used to
> create the secret keys you use when you access web sites, or use
> cryptography systems like SSH and PGP.
>
> Openness is important, we're open sourcing our hardware design and our
> firmware, our board is even designed with a removable RF noise shield (a
> 'tin foil hat') so that you can check to make sure that the circuits
> that are inside are exactly the same as the circuits we build and sell.
> In order to make sure that our boards cannot be compromised during
> shipping we make sure that the internal firmware load is signed and
> cannot be spoofed.



More information about the cryptography mailing list